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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

HERBERT LEE SHONDEL.

11287

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Herbert Lee Shondel, appeals
from a conviction of the crime of unlawful possession
of LSD in the Third District Court of Salt Lake
,......
\__,ounty
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with
the unlawful possession of LSD. After an unsuccessful motion to quash, the appellant admitted his possession and was found guilty as charged and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the commission
of a felony.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the appellant's
conviction should be affirmed.
STATEJv1ENT OF FACTS
On December 27, 1967, the defendant-appellant
was arrested (R-10) and later charged by way of informaticn for the unlawful possession of LSD on or
about October 6, 1967 (R-12).
At the time of trial, counsel for the defendant
made an unsuccessful motion to quash the information, or, in the alternative, to reduce the charge to a
misdemeanor based upon a contended inconsist·
ency between the two acts (R-18, 37). The court denied counsel's motion and informed defendant that
he was charged with a felony. Whereupon, while
not pleading guilty to the offense, the defendant admitted to being in possession of LSD, after which the
court found him guilty as charged. Time for sentencing was waived and the defendant was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate sentence as provided by law (R-18, 40).
In 1967 the Utah State Legislature amended the
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, Title 58, Chapter 13a,
U.C.A. (1953) to include d-lysergic acid diethylamide, better known as LSD. This was accomplished
by the addition of subsections 15 and 16 to 58-13a,l:
U.C.A. (1953). This amendment, which was passeo
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March 2, 1967, and became effective May 9, 1967,
made the possession of LSD a felony. (See 58-13a-44,
U.C.A. (1953), enacted L. of 1957, ch. 116, § 1.)
During the same session the Legislature enacted the Drug Abuse Control Law, Title 58, Chapter
33, U.C.A. (1953). In this act, LSD, along with a number of other chemical compositions, was placed under the headinq of "depressant or stimulant drugs."
Its possession was declared a misdemeanor by section 58-33-4(a).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO QUASH, AS THE LAWS OF
UTAH RELATING TO POSSESSION OF LSD ARE NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION, IN THAT WHILE THE UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF LSD IS PROSCRIBED IN SEPARATE
STATUTES, THOSE STATUTES ARE CONSISTENT IN
THE PUNISHMENT TO BE APPLIED.

The appellant contends that different provisions

of existing Utah law in the form of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, Title 58, Chapter 13a, U.C.A. (1953)

as amended, and the Drug Abuse Control Law, Title
58. Chapter 33, U.C.A. (1967), are in conflict with
each other as they allegedly provide different punishments for the same offense.
While it is true that both acts recite the unlaw-
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ful possession of LSD, it can hardly be contended
that separate punishments are provided by each of
these two acts.
Section .S8-13a-44 clearly states:
... Any person violating any other provisions [one
of which proscribes the unlawful possession of LSD
(Section .58-13a-1 ( 16) ) ] of this chapter, shall, upon
conviction be punished for the first offense by a
fine of not less than $1,000 or by imprisonment in
the Utah State Prison for not exceeding five years,
or by both such fine and imprisonment. . . .
(Bracketed portion added.)

It should be noted that that portion (section 58·
l 3a-l (16)) adding unlawful possession of LSD to a
felony statute, was passed by the 1967 Legislature,
the same Legislature which shortly thereafter enacted the Drug Abuse Control Law. LSD was specifically designated as a "narcotic drug" in the
amended subsection.
While section 58-33-4(a) of the Drug Abuse Control Law indirectly designates the unlawful posses·
sion of LSD as a misdemeanor, the limited import
of that act can only be ascertained from a thorough
reading of the entire act. One need only proceed to
subsection (g) of section 58-33-6 of the same act to
determine the real intent of the Legislature in dealing with LSD.
This subsection unequivocally states:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act,
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whenever the possession, sale, transfer or dispensing
of any drug or substance would constitute an offense under this act and also constitutes an offense
under the laws of this state relating to the possession, sale, transfer or dispensing of narcotic drugs
or marijuana [Article 58, Chapter 13a, Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, as amended], such offense shall not
be punishable under this Act but shall be punishable under such other provision of law [notably
58-13a-44]. (Bracketed portions added.)

The appellant contends that because a prosecutor may avail himself of either statute in meting
out punishment in differing degrees for the same
offense, the appellant is being denied equal protection, and the legislation is therefore unconstitutional. This contention may well have had merit if
the prosecutor were free to pick and choose those
portions of existing law which he desired to be effective and could likewise completely disregard
those portions of the law with which he disagreed.
Such is, of course, not the case, and the entire act
or statute must be given effect.
In giving- effect to the entire act, it can be ascertained with little difficulty that a prosecutor is bound
by very explicit language (to treat the offense in
question as a felony and not as a misdemeanor).
The appellant attempts to escape the affect of
the language in section 58-33-6(g) which states that
the offense ''. . . shall not be punishable under this
act. ... " (emphasis added) by contending that such
language might be directory as opposed to mandatory.
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The question as to whether statutory language
should be deemed directory or mandatory is not one
of first impression in this jurisdiction. In the case of
State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah 2d 45, 347 P.2d 111 (1960)
which dealt, in part, with the proper interpretation
of an habitual criminal statute, this court indicated
that the word "shall" in a statute is usually presumed to be mandatory. In the more recent case of
Sjostrom v. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393 P.2d 472
(1964), a case involving the proper interpretation of
a statute requiring divulgence by city officials of
campaign expenses and contributors, this court said
that in determining whether provisions of a statute
are mandatory or directory, the court must analyze
the statute in light of its history and background,
the purpose it was designed to accomplish, and
what interpretation and application will best serve
that purpose in practical operation.
In view of the manifest intent of the Legislature
to make the offense in question a felony by specific
amendment to an already existing statute; and also
in view of the apparent reaffirmation of that intent
in a latter statute, it is difficult to conceive of the
Legislature using anything but mandatory language
concerning an offense about which they apparently
felt so strongly.
POINT II
THE TRTAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S ALTERNATIVE REQUEST TO co~
STRUE THE OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF LSD TU

l
BE A MISDEMEANOR, FOR IN FACT, THE LATEST
EXPRESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, UNREPEALED
BY IMPLICATION OR OTHERWISE, REAFFIRMED
THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT THAT UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION OF LSD SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE
TREATED AS A FELONY.

Assuming arguendo that where two enactments of the Legislature are clearly inconsistent
and irreconcilable, the latest expression of the Leg]slature takes precedence over the former, even if
such occurs within the same legislative session. This
contention has little relevancy where it has been
shown that the enactments in question are in no
way irreconcilably inconsistent. The respondent
submits that the question of inconsistency or conflict
has been adequately answered in the first point of
this argument.

It is interesting to note, however, that in accepting the doctrine of "latest legislative expression,"
the appellant has difficulty in escaping the fact that
section 58-33-G(g), U.C.A. (1953), which deferrs punishment to the felony statute, is a later legislative expression than that found in section 58-33-4(a). If
chronology is the key to legislative intent, then
again, the felony punishment must prevail.
The respondent is indebted to the appellant for
his citing Tortorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397
P.2d 984 (1965) which states that whenever possible,
the court in construing statutes should give effect
to every part of an act. Using this reasoning in conJunction with the ma_nifest latest expression of legis-
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lative intent, the respondent contends that the court
below not only acted with propriety, but necessarily acted within the narrow bounds of legislative
mandate.
POINT III
THE 'I'RTAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO REDUCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT TO A MISDEMEANOR IN THAT NO CONFLICT
EXISTS AS TO THE PUNISHMENT AS A FELONY.
STATUTORILY REQUIRED, FOR THE UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION OF LSD, NOR CAN THE DOCTRINE OF
LENITY APPLY. IF THERE BE SUCH, WHERE ONLY
A SINGLE PUNISHMENT IS PRESCRIBED.

In answering Point III of the appellant's argu·
ment it would be, for the most part, a mere reiteration of respondenf s treatment of Points I and II. Appellant maintains throughout each point of his argument that irreconcilable conflict demands reversal
and a declaration of unconstitutionality. Little more
can be said than by every measure of accepted
standards for legislative interpretation and construction, no conflict exists between the disputed
statutes.
There are numerous authorities in which it is
said that penal statutes must be construed strictly, a
rule founded on the plain principle that the power
of punishment is vested in the legislature in which
lies the authority to define crimes and ordain pun
ishment. The true rule is that stated in The Gauntlet:
1

1

(1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 184, 191, per James L. J. in giving judgment
the judicial committee. CF. 2 H & C 531.

111
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No doubt. all penal statutes are to be construed
strictly-that is to say, the court must see that the
thing charged as an offense is within the plain
meaning of the words used; must not strain the
words on any notion that there has been a slip, that
there has been a casus omissus; that the thing is so
clearly within the mischief that it must have been
intended to be included, and would have been included if thought of. On the other hand, the person
charged has a right to say that the thing charged,
though within the words is not within the spirit of
the enactment. But where the thing is brought
within the words and within the spirit, there a
penal enactment is to be construed, like any other
instrument, according to the fair common sense
meaning of the language used; and the court is not
to find or to make any doubt or ambiguity in the
language of a penal statute where such doubt or
ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in
the same language in any other instrument.

The construction, as propounded by the respondent, will avoid undesirable consequences, a
cardinal goal ih interpreting legislation. Such a construction would manifestly give meaning to displayed legislative sentiment and intent. Also, the
law is presumed to be equitable, and it is a reasonable and safe rule of construction to resolve any
ambiguity in a statute in favor of an equitable operation of the law. (See 50 Am.Jur. Statutes, § 369372.)
As far ris the doctrine of lenity is concerned, it
is interesting to note that the only cases cited by the
appellant in his brief, Lander v. United States, 358
lJ S. 169 (1958); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322
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(1957); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) concerned the merging of possibly construed separate
offenses into a single crime, and were astonishingly
dissimilar with the case at hand.
In any event, as was mentioned, it is extremely
difficult to evaluate and apply such a doctrine
where only a single punishment for a single offense
is prescribed.
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that there
is no irreconcilable conflict between the two acts
of the Legislature which are herein discussed and
although the Legislature may have inserted the pos·
session of LSD in two separate statutes, it is clear
from their expression in section 58-33-6(g) that they
intended and in fact did provide for one punishment for the possession of LSD and for that which
the appellant was convicted and sentenced. This
court should therefore affirm the decision of the
lower court in denying appellant's motion and hold·
ing that the appellant was properly charged with
a felony.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Assistant Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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